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Padma Desai
O
n May 22,1999, Dr. Anatoly Chubais, Chief Economic 
Officer, United Energy Systems, Russian Federation, 
and architect of Russia’s privatization program, gave 
an interview to Professor Padma Desai, Harriman Professor of 
Comparative Economic Systems, and Director, Center for 
Transition Economies, Columbia University. Dr. Chubais 
responded to questions on a variety of economic and political 
issues. Below is an edited version of the interview.
Desai: You are such a committed believer in the 
market economy. How did your commitment start?
Chubais: My belief in the market economy has a long 
history. It started long before the market economy 
started in Russia. I graduated from the St. Petersburg 
engineering economics school. It was clear to me that 
the Soviet economy was in terrible shape and was 
headed toward disaster. It was difficult to find 
reasonable answers for the situation in the Soviet 
economy. Articles in textbooks and scientific journals 
discussed different ideas without clearly understanding 
them or how an economy worked. I had a clear 
understanding myself and I found several people in St. 
Petersburg in the mid-eighties and later who had 
similar views. We got to work, started finding books 
that were forbidden in the Soviet Union, and 
established contacts with Western economists that also 
were almost forbidden at that time.
D: Can you remember some books?
C: Yes, the works of Janos Kornai, Milton Friedman 
and Hayek. We also established contact with Yegor 
Gaidar’s team in Moscow. We did not just discuss our 
ideas but undertook solid work, prepared reports, 
researched the New Economic Policy of the early 
1920s in the Soviet Union, and studied Hungarian and 
Yugoslav reforms. All this was not easy to do in the
Soviet Union. Our basic goal was to get a firm idea of 
the fundamental changes that needed to be undertaken.
D: It seems that there was a group of likeminded 
young people who thought like you and who believed 
that there should be a market economy in Russia...
C: Yes. But I would say that we did not have a 
common belief, a clear understanding from the very 
beginning. We tried to find solutions stage by stage, 
we reached the answers in terms of basic changes such 
as private property, competition, and free prices. All 
this came from prolonged discussions. We did not 
accept it from the very beginning.
D: There is a view here that almost all the USAID 
funding was given to the group of reformers led by 
Chubais and that the fund givers from this end did not 
seek out other groups and encourage pluralism in 
Russia. You must be aware of it. How would you react 
to that?
C: You know, it is a very simple question. When we 
started in 1989, in November 1989, it was a team 
consisting of 15, maximum 20 people. We were the 
only team in the country who could discuss, not just 
discuss but make changes. At that time, our problem 
was that there was no alternative. Grigory Yavlinsky 
was with us at that time. He was a member of the team 
that prepared the 500-day program. But the fact was 
that there were no other teams. Before 1991, Imyself 
spent years trying to find individuals everywhere in the 
country—in Novosibirsk, in Moscow Institutes, in St. 
Petersburg, Odessa and Ukraine, in Minsk and 
Sverdlovsk, and several Russian cities. When we 
became part of the government in 1991, all who were 
able to contribute something were invited. They came 
to the government, including Yavlinsky, all except one 
or two. Of course, there were a number of alternative
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government think-tanks but all those were Communist. 
It was simple: we or the Communists.
D: You emerged as a reformer explicitly in 1992 with 
your privatization program, voucher privatization in 
particular, and I believe that it was motivated by 
ideological considerations. You wanted Russian 
industry out of state ownership and control, converting 
industrial units into joint stock companies with 
diversified ownership. Would you agree with that 
view?
C: Absolutely.
D: Private ownership promotes economic efficiency 
via incentives, but that was not your primary motive. 
The decision to issue vouchers to every man, woman 
and child, worth 10,000 rubles each, was a populist 
measure that was calculated to remove state hold over 
industry. People thought that they would become 
instant capitalists by putting their vouchers in this or 
that industry. They supported the program, and indeed 
the President and his reforms in the subsequent April 
1993 referendum. Voucher privatization, in other 
words, was a huge political gambit, which pushed the 
reform momentum forward, kept it alive. Would you 
agree with that analysis?
C: Yes. I think it was clear from the very beginning 
that a simple and transparent way of privatization did 
not exist. So some would gain and others would lose. 
A number of people would be unsatisfied with the 
outcome but the fundamental problem was: will it 
happen or not? From an economic point of view, 
voucher privatization, the voucher itself, was not the 
best way for privatization. More to the point, it was 
clear that the voucher was a substitute for money, and 
if you issue a voucher, you will not get money from 
privatization by selling state properties, but that was the 
price. It was the only way to make it doable.
D: So ultimately, the public sort of felt cheated and 
factories have remained in the charge of Soviet era 
managers who have failed to retool them. So what are 
the gains of privatization in your view?
C: I did not hear the question.
D: Well, in the end, the public did feel cheated. 
General Lebed said later that the voucher would not 
even buy an iron. And the factories, most of them, have 
not been restructured. So what do you think are the 
gains from privatization?
C: Well, let us separate the goal from what was not the 
goal. No one said that the goal of voucher privatization 
was to restructure private property, to restructure 
companies, to attract investments, to speed up 
economic growth or to increase the standard of living, 
because it was clear that the process would take several 
stages. Voucher privatization was just asset 
distribution, leading to the next stage of property 
concentration, resulting in new investment , finally 
leading to enterprise restructuring. There are at least 
four or five stages.
D: So you had some sequencing in mind.
C: Yes, General Lebed and Mayor Luzhkov also stated 
that voucher privatization would not attract investment. 
No one thought that we would immediately get 
economic growth in Russia by distributing vouchers.
D: The harshest criticism was leveled against the loans 
for share program, as a result of which a few bankers 
advanced credits for supporting the government budget 
and for bankrolling President Yeltsin’s 1996 June 
election. Eventually they came to own a sizeable share 
of Russia’s lucrative industrial units. Would you 
repeat that scheme again, loans for shares?
C: No, this kind of scheme could not be repeated. 
There is no need for it. Loans for shares began in 
1995. Till that time, we did not get even small cash 
from privatization because it was property sale for 
vouchers. In fact, no one believed that we could get 
real money from the sale of state property in exchange 
for vouchers. The scheme was controversial at the 
time. Politically, I was in one of the most complicated 
situations being under serious attack from several 
branch ministries, from the railroad and transport 
ministries, from the Duma, and from some governors. 
So the dilemma was simple—either we will not sell 
state shares at all or we will sell them via the 
controversial shares scheme which would bring real 
money to the Russian budget. Don’t forget that with the 
sale of Norilsk Nickel shares, we got the first 170
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million dollars. It was absolutely fantastic. It helped 
the federal budget a lot because the budget situation 
was critical.
D: But you don’t think that as a result of this scheme, 
you brought into being Russia’s oligarchs as powerful 
lobbies and, in spring 1998, Sergei Kiryienko, the 
young reformist Prime Minister, was battling the left 
wing in the- Duma led by the Communists and the 
oligarchs- on the right. So he was dealing with two 
opponents at the same time.
C: Well, let us decide if the oligarchs are good or bad. 
Let us understand that the oligarchs are the big 
Russian private business with the positive and negative 
features they bring to Russia. The fact is this private 
business was the major political resource for preventing 
Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov from becoming 
President in 1996. I strongly believe that the only way 
of preventing Zyuganov from becoming president in 
1996 was the creation of big private business in 
Russia. Their mentality differed from Soviet style 
management. They were mainly younger people 
attracting hundreds of thousands of new employees in 
their companies while restructuring them that began 
with Norilsk Nickel and Yukos, the oil company. They 
started capital investment. They began attracting 
foreign investment. They fought for improving 
efficiency. These were the goals of privatization in its 
next phase. That was the economic side of the story. 
At the same time, they became powerful, wanting to 
use their power according to their understanding of the 
political situation. The Presidential election of June 
1996 raised the question of Yeltsin or Zyuganov, and 
they definitely said Yeltsin. However, in the next 
phase, they thought that they ruled the world and could 
do anything. So there are positive and negative sides 
to the story.
D: Do you think that the influence of private business, 
the so-called oligarchs, has been crippled as a result of 
the financial meltdown of August 1998?
C: No doubt about it. Of the seven big names in 1996, 
half of them did not exist in 1998.
D: Let us move forward in time. Why did the President 
fire Prime Minister Primakov?
C: It was for the political compromise that Primakov 
managed. The price of the political compromise that 
Primakov achieved was increased influence of the 
communists. This role increased constantly, and in the 
next phase, they could be the political force in the 
country.
D: But you don’t think the President removed him 
because Primakov was becoming increasingly popular 
with the public. He fired Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
in March 1998 because Chernomyrdin was beginning 
to have presidential ambitions.
C: I know this President. Let me answer this question 
in a simple way. The President is now going to find his 
successor. So it should be clear to everyone that the 
President will not run in the presidential election next 
year. It is clear that he needs to find someone. The 
problem is not that Chernomyrdin or Primakov gets too 
much public support. The problem is that both are not 
accepted by President Yeltsin as successors. That is 
the reason for firing Primakov.
D: He would not accept them as successors ?
C: No, no.
D: Do you think he has a successor in mind? 1 don’t 
want any names, but does he have a successor in 
mind?
C: At least I know that it is one of his main priorities.
D: How do you assess the new Prime Minister, Sergei 
Stepashin? Even if he formulates a credible 
government, can he manage to overcome Communist 
opposition and the continuing opposition of the 
Yavlinsky Yabloko group, which has declared its 
opposition?
C: Well, I think that Stepashin, despite his background 
and his unfavorable perception in the West because of 
his KGB past, the Chechnya war and things like that, is 
absolutely reasonable, a representative of the new 
generation of Russian politicians. He will be able to
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build a wide political bloc, including Yavlinksy’s 
group. He could build genuine rapport with the 
Russian people because he is good in public 
policymaking, he is good in administrative functions, 
he is good with journalists, he is good with the Duma, 
and he is good with the governors. So he is respected 
by the Russian power elite and has real support of the 
Russian population.
D: So you are hopeful, more than hopeful, that the 
Duma will pass the legislation which the IMF is asking 
before it releases the $4.5 billion funding?
C: No, I don’t think so.
D: They won’tpass it?
C: No, no.
D: So what will happen then?
C: I think that the Duma, after the failed impeachment 
of the President and the overwhelming support of the 
people in favor of impeachment, will seek an 
opportunity to express its protest and the best 
opportunity will be to cancel this IMF package. 
Zyuganov said a week ago that he supported the 
government-IMF agreement, but I am sure that in a 
week, he will say that this agreement is anti-people, 
undermines Russia’s sovereignty and things like that. 
I am sure that the Duma will be against it. I think that 
it is a serious problem. The Stepashin government, the 
IMF and the World Bank should sit down, analyze the 
whole list of problems they have, understand those that 
could be supported by the Duma and let go of the rest.
D: Do you think that the current government will be a 
caretaker government until the Duma December 1999 
elections. That is what Yegor Gaidar said yesterday.
C: Let me tell you my assessment of the government. 
I do not think that Stepashin will immediately 
undertake major political steps and economic 
transformation. He does not need to do that. I do not 
think it is necessary now. In my view, the next stage of 
the Russian economic reforms will not start before the 
next Russian presidential election.
D: What are your best guesses about the composition 
of the new Duma as a result of the December 1999 
elections ?
C: I don’t think that something really radical will 
happen. The communists will still be number one but I 
do hope that they will lose the majority. But there is a 
risk—the extreme left Communists will overcome the 
required 5 percent barrier because of theYugoslav 
NATO bombing. The party of Luzhkov, the Mayor of 
Moscow, will definitely get an entry in the Duma and 
be number one or two.
D: You met with a variety of business groups in 
America. You met with the IMF and the Treasury 
officials. In the old days, the general view was that the 
IMF, pressured by the Treasury, will always support 
Russian reform because Russia has so many nuclear 
warheads that it cannot be allowed to go bust? Do 
you think that they have now gotten rid of this position?
C: In all my discussions with the IMF that I have had 
since 1995,1 never discussed political positions. We 
discussed the IMF program itself, the growth rates of 
money supply and money demand, foreign exchange 
reserves and things like that. We discussed the 
institutional-structural changes that must be made. 
They expressed their understanding, we expressed our 
understanding. The discussions were very tough. But I 
never used the argument that if you include specific 
measures asking us to overhaul, say, the Russian 
Railway Ministry, and if we do not implement them, 
then the Communists will return or that our nuclear 
forces will become unmanageable. Such things are not 
discussed with the IMF or the Treasury.
D: Well, you do not discuss them explicitly, but they 
discuss them among themselves.
C: I don’t know, maybe.





D: Why not? Because people here worry about it, as 
soon as something goes wrong with Russia.
C: Oh, well. A number of worries that exist here are 
absolutely unrealistic. On the other hand, serious 
problems in Russia that are extremely dangerous are 
not understood here. I do not believe at all in Russia 
falling apart. With the increasing awareness of the 
need for a strong ruble, with the adoption of the 1993 
Constitution, with the elections in the Russian regions, 
the chances of Russia’s dissolution, in my view, do not 
exist. It was an issue in 1992, and in 1993 in our 
relations with Tatarstan. Currently, the remaining 
problem that needs to be resolved is Chechnya.
D: Dagestan?
C: Dagestan? No.
D: The final question. When I watch your breathtaking 
career as a reformer, I feel that you regard the reform 
process as an ideological battle between the reformers 
and the communists. I think you are a brilliant 
strategist who believes that every strategy has pluses 
and minuses but that the pluses must dominate, and 
that the process must move forward as a result. You 
do not also want to distinguish between ends and 
means. You believe that you are dealing with a ruthless 
adversary and therefore all means are a fair game.
C: I do believe that everything that has happened in 
Russia in the last decade has been a fight between 
Communists and non-Communists to a greater extent 
than anywhere in Eastern Europe and on a much bigger 
scale, with more risk than in Poland or in East 
European countries. That is the essence of what is 
going on in Russia. It is clear that after several 
generations of Communist life, we could not get out of 
it in one year. At the same time, I believe that the 
strategic choice must be pragmatic. It does not mean 
that there are no moral limits. It does not imply that any 
means can be used for achieving these goals. At the 
very least, if immoral steps are used, they will 
immediately be used by the opponents.
D: Like what?
C: I cannot think of an example. I am trying to explain 
our strategy. Our strategy is to win. We have to win. I 
mean we shall win, but I do not think we can use any 
means for the purpose, even with the understanding 
that the game we are playing is quite serious, and that 
if we lose, we will just disappear physically, there is no 
doubt about it. So we are paying the price that nobody 
in the West has paid for this game. That is why it is a 
very serious game. But that does not mean that we can 
use any means for reaching our goal.
D: Don’tyoufeel tired sometimes? Don’t you want to 
just throw in the towel sometimes?
C: All of us feel tired sometimes. For ten years, I 
have been feeling tired.
D: You should come here and become a professor for 
a while.
C: I do not want to be a professor. I hate giving 
lectures.
(Laughter)
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